

# **Segmented Europeanization**

**The Transnationalization of Public Spheres in Europe:**

**Trends and Patterns**

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## Introduction<sup>1</sup>

The notion of the public sphere has come to play an important role in the debate on the European Union's democratic legitimacy. Particularly since the erosion of the "permissive consensus" and a growing opposition to the EU in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty (see e.g. Niedermayer 1995), the emergence of a communicative infrastructure between the EU and its citizens has become a touchstone for the legitimacy of European governance. Not only has public support for the integration process steadily declined since the beginning of the 1990s, but Eurobarometer surveys also show that Europeans are not sufficiently informed about the EU and often feel alienated from decision-making in Brussels. They tend to see the EU as remote and at the same time too intrusive (European Commission 2001, 3).

Against this background, democratic theory suggests that the "widening gulf between the EU and the people" (European Commission 2001, 5) does not result primarily from a lack of formally democratic institutions at the EU level, but from an imbalance between the increasing transfer of political power from European nation-states to the supranational European polity on the one hand and the still-national orientation of political debate and

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opinion formation on the other hand (c.f. Gerhards 2000, 2001, Scharpf 1999, Grimm 1995). As Jürgen Habermas (2001, 7) has put it, “The democratic deficit [of the European Union] can only be resolved if a European public sphere emerges in which the democratic process is embedded” (translated by the authors). If the nation-state remains the primary focus for public political debates and opinion formation, if the transfer of decision-making powers to the EU is not accompanied by a prominent role for EU institutions and policies in the public discourse within EU member countries, European integration runs the risk of depriving citizens of a constitutive feature of democracy: the possibility to inform themselves, reason about, scrutinize, criticize, and eventually influence policymaking.

A related line of argument refers to the role of public discourse for European polity building and political identity formation. It puts emphasis on the integration of national public spheres in Europe and states that a European “community of communication” (Habermas) and some sense of belonging to a common collective are a constitutive feature of a democratic and legitimate European Union (Eriksen 2004; Risse 2003; Kielmansegg 1996). This perspective focuses on the “horizontal” dimension of Europeanization, i.e. communicative interaction and exchange across national communities (Peters et al., 2005; van de Steeg 2002), or links the Europeanization of public spheres directly to the formation of a common European perspective on EU issues (Eder and Kantner 2000; Gerhards 2000), the construction of Europe as a community of fate or of common memory (Kielmansegg 1996; Risse and van de Steeg 2003), and the emergence of a common European public (Peters et al., 2005). In this article, we present a multi-dimensional model of the Europeanization of public spheres (EPS) that integrates these perspectives as different dimensions of Europeanization and examines them empirically.

So far, the debate on EPS has focused primarily on the conditions and obstacles for the emergence of a European public sphere, often with a pessimistic stance (Eriksen 2004, Eriksen and Fossum 2000, Greven 2000, Grimm 1995, Habermas 1998, Kielmansegg 1996, Peters 1999, Schmalz-Bruns 1999). To a large degree, however, it lacks empirical grounding or provides only snapshots of a long-term process. Despite the increasing attention of scholars on EPS, it is therefore still an open question whether, to what extent, and with which quality a transformation of public spheres in Europe has taken place. Has political communication in Europe already outstripped the level of routine foreign policy coverage as Eder and Kantner (2000, 307) claim? Or is the Europeanization of public spheres still lagging far behind the increasing impact of EU decision-making on European citizens as Gerhards' (2000) study on Germany suggests? We know from previous research that there are relatively high levels of Europeanization in terms of national similarities in certain EU-focused debates such as the discussion about the participation of Jörg Haider's party in the Austrian government (Risse and van de Steeg 2003), the euro (Law, Middleton and Palmer 2000; de Vreese, Peter and Semetko 2001), EU enlargement (van de Steeg 2000), or the "corruption scandal" of the Commission in 1999 (Trenz 2002, 2000; Meyer 1999). From the "Europub" project (Koopmans 2004) as well as research by Meyer (2005), we further learn that policy fields tend to be more Europeanized the more they are institutionalized at the EU level and contested among member states. But so far we know very little about the overall pattern of Europeanization of the national public spheres, and we know hardly anything about their long-term development.

This contribution addresses the empirical desideratum by presenting the results of a quantitative analysis of newspapers in five EU member states (Germany, Great Britain, France, Austria, and Denmark) over the two decades 1982 – 2003. It is based on a systematic framework that helps to avoid the pitfalls of exaggerating or underplaying the contemporary form and degree of Europeanization. Our framework is multi-dimensional and hence acknowledges that Europeanization can take different forms and qualities. Furthermore, in contrast to most studies, it puts emphasis on the process character of Europeanization by taking a long-term perspective. Finally, in contrast to other studies that narrow down their focus on EU issues and policies, our cross-sectional analysis gives a broader picture of the development of public spheres and covers all topics of political discourse. This allows us to compare the Europeanization of public spheres with broader forms of transnationalization such as Westernization.

This article looks at Europeanization from a public discourse perspective. We follow the suggestions of Bernhard Peters to understand *discourse* as occurring, whenever a debate takes place in which statements and judgements are backed by justification, argumentative or evidentiary support (Peters 2005: 87).<sup>2</sup> *Public* discourse should be openly accessible to a wider public. It constitutes “the primary medium for the development of public knowledge, values, interpretations and self-understandings for change and innovation, as well as reproduction or transmission over time in the inventory of ideas and arguments that are available in a given public sphere” (Peters 2005: 88). In modern society, the mass media are the prime carriers of public discourse since they are able to reach a general audience. Having said that, it is self-evident that most media content is not discursive according to the definition

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<sup>2</sup> We are aware that Foucault and others have proposed different understandings of the term. Our definition is closely related to Habermas’ notion of the term (cf. Peters 2005).

established above. We are analysing national quality newspapers since they reach a considerable audience and they are widely regarded as the primary medium of continuous discussion of political questions based on justification and arguments. Below, we suggest strategies to identify discursive content in quality newspapers (see p.XY).

This research has to be seen in the wider context of the transitions of statehood analyzed at the various projects at the Collaborative Research Center in Bremen. These transitions are supposed to add up to a “defibration” of the “Western Democratic Constitutional Interventionist State (DCIS)”.<sup>3</sup> One important feature of this development is transnationalization. This paper seeks to determine whether this development of the nation state is paralleled by an transnationalization of national public spheres in Europe.

The article proceeds in four steps. In the first part, we have briefly elaborated our theoretical assumptions and proposed a discursive approach to EPS. In the second part, we discuss our approach by distinguishing four dimensions of Europeanization: 1. Monitoring governance (i.e. the focus of domestic debates on EU institutions and policies), 2. the mutual observation of national public discourses, 3. discursive exchange that grasps the exchange of opinions and arguments across national borders, 4. collective identification with Europe as an indicator for the development of a common European perspective. The third part describes how we measure Europeanization. Finally, in the fourth part we present the results of our media analysis on the four dimensions of Europeanization by systematically comparing each with other possible patterns of transnationalization, specifically Westernization.

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<sup>3</sup> See URL: <http://www.staatlichkeit.uni-bremen.de> for the research programme of the CRC 597.

## Four Dimensions of Europeanization

Given the absence of a common language and common media system (c.f. Schlesinger 1999) Jürgen Gerhards (1993, 2000) has suggested thinking of the European public sphere not in terms of a unified public sphere, but of the Europeanization of various national public spheres. He thus proposes taking national public spheres as a starting point for the emergence of a European public discourse. While this approach is now widely accepted among scholars working on this issue, there is still disagreement on how to conceptualize Europeanization. Is the orientation of public discourse towards the EU the crucial indicator, as Gerhards (2000) suggests? Are Eder and his collaborators right when they claim that a common European “frame of reference” in domestic EU debates is the benchmark for Europeanization (Eder and Kantner 2000)? Or should we instead conceive of Europeanization in terms of intensified “discursive interaction” between different countries (van de Steeg 2000, 2002) or the emergence of a European “identity light” (Risse 2003)? Our approach does not attempt to resolve this dispute, but acknowledges that Europeanization and transnationalization in general can take different patterns and qualities. We conceptualize Europeanization as a multi-dimensional and gradual process that in one way or another extends public discourse beyond national spaces.

A central aspiration for our study is the classic work of Deutsch (1966 [1953]) on “Nationalism and Social Communication”. Deutsch argues that a nation is a political community sustained by intensified communicative interaction. For him, the defining feature

of a nation is neither a common language nor shared memories or past history, but the ability of its members “to communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects with members of one large group than with outsiders” (Deutsch 1966 [1953], 97). Consequently, Europeanization and transnationalization in general can be understood as a process that enlarges communicative interaction in one way or another beyond national borders. At its core is “the extension of social spaces, which are constituted by dense transactions beyond national borders without being necessarily global in scope” (Zürn 2000, 187; see also Zürn 1998). Characterized in such a way, Europeanization is not primarily an outcome of EU-induced pressure for change as is frequently suggested by EU scholars (see e.g. Cowles et al., 2001), but part of broader societal processes of transformation that are addressed in the literature as transnationalization, globalization, or denationalization (see in particular Held et al., 1999; Zürn 1998).

What does this imply for the Europeanization of public spheres? First, transnationalization can be regarded as a process that enlarges the *scope* of public discourse beyond the territorial state. Public attention might then be directed either towards the EU or towards other European countries. However, transnationalization might also be understood as a more profound transformation characterized by intensified discursive interaction across national borders and the emergence of a *common European discourse*. Whether such transnational spaces of ‘objectively’ dense communicative exchange are acknowledged ‘subjectively’ as *common public realms* furthermore depends on the extent to which participants in public discourse develop a sense of belonging to the same public. Based on these considerations, we distinguish four dimensions of Europeanization: monitoring governance, mutual observation, discursive exchange, and collective identification.



The first dimension, *monitoring governance*, is determined by a growing attention of public discourse to European institutions and policies. It shows whether political decisions taken at the EU level are exposed to the same potential pressure for public justification as domestic policy-making. From a normative point of view, this dimension addresses the question of the extent to which the EPS endows European citizens with the possibility to inform themselves, reason about, and scrutinize EU policymaking, hence with “communicative power” (Habermas) in the European multi-level system. It draws on the widespread assumption that European policymaking dries up societal sources of influence while privileging national executives. Their privileged access to European information, it is argued, opens the way to strategically manipulating domestic policy debates (Moravcsik 1994; Zürn 2000). Empirically, we assume that public spheres are more Europeanized the more the EU is the subject of public scrutiny.

While public monitoring of EU governance is characterized by the emergence of a “vertical” observation of international organizations by national publics, our second dimension, *mutual observation*, covers the extent to which the scope of public discourse enlarges “horizontally” into a wider (European) public space. It depicts to what degree public debates observe and pay attention to political developments in other (European) countries. Koopmans and Erbe (2003, 4) have rightly pointed out that “in an intergovernmental polity, it may matter a great deal who wins the elections in another member state, or what kind of new policy another member state develops in a particular policy field” (Koopmans and Erbe 2003, 4).

Normatively, mutual observation is a precondition for understanding that in an increasingly integrated Europe political problems might not just be a matter of domestic politics, but also

of common concern. Empirically, we assume that public discourse is more Europeanized the more political developments in other European countries are observed.

Both mutual observation and monitoring governance are segmented forms of Europeanization. They contribute to a de-borderization of public discourse, but do not necessarily involve the emergence of a new, extended communicative space across territorial states. Public monitoring generates parallel universes of EU-focused public discourses without connecting them with each other. It is therefore a form of “EUization” rather than of broader Europeanization. Mutual observation partly transcends the segmentation of public spheres by including other European countries as relevant units in domestic political debates, but it still does not create a common discourse. It requires that Europeans talk about each other, but not necessarily to each other. In contrast, our third dimension adds the *discursive exchange* between various national public spheres as a more integrated form of Europeanization.

From a normative perspective, discursive exchange is a crucial prerequisite for the emergence of a common European opinion formation. It includes into domestic discourse other European opinions and arguments, where they then can serve as a point of reference for the formulation of one’s own position. In that sense discursive exchange has been regarded as a mechanism for overcoming national solipsism and self-centeredness (cf. Scharpf 1999, 688). From an empirical perspective, however, discursive transnationalization is less demanding. It grasps to what degree public spheres are open and permeable for opinions, ideas, and contributions from other spheres. At its core is the “osmotic diffusion” of ideas and opinions across national borders (Peters 1999, 662f; Habermas 2001, 120).

While most scholars agree that some kind of communicative linkage between national public spheres is an important feature of EPS, there is widespread dissent on how to conceptualize this dimension. Eder and Kantner (2000, 81) argue that national public spheres are already integrated transnationally if “the same issues are debated at the same time with the same criteria of relevance”. Although this kind of parallelization of public debates certainly facilitates mutual understanding, it measures the ‘connectivability’ of public spheres rather than their actual “connectivity” (Trenz 2004, 292). How then can we be sure that discursive interaction takes place? We assume that national public spheres are more transnationalized the more the media circulate opinions and arguments across national borders. An elementary form of transnational circulation is the reception of arguments from foreign actors and the reference to it in one’s own contributions by direct and indirect quotations. Another important form of transnational communication is imports of cultural products or contributions ‘in toto’, such as contributions by foreign authors in the media.

Finally, as discursive Europeanization, *collective identification* contributes to a more integrated EPS. It defines Europeanization in terms of the emergence of a common transnational “community of communication” (Habermas) and measures the sense of belonging to a common European public. In the literature on EU legitimacy the emergence of a common European identity or *demos* is frequently referred to as a necessary precondition for the legitimacy of the EU (Cederman 2001; Scharpf 1999; Weiler 1999; Zürn 2000). For instance, Kielmansegg argues that Europe lacks a solid political identity, which guarantees the loyalty of citizens towards the political system even if their personal interests are hurt by the decisions of this system (Kielmansegg 1996: 54). As Risse (2003, 8) rightly has pointed out,

however, the transnationalization of public identities does not necessarily presuppose such a “thick” conception of collective identity. At stake is rather “identity light”, i.e. “some minimum sense of belonging to the same community” (ibid.). Collective identification then points to what Eder and his collaborators have called a “Teilnehmerperspektive”, i.e. a perspective as participants in a common discourse (Eder and Kantner 2000). If speakers in public discourse argue from a participant’s perspective, they acknowledge that the issue discussed concerns “us” as members of a common community.

We use explicit reference of speakers to a common European public as a rough indicator for collective identification. Hence, we assume that public identities are more Europeanized the more actors explicitly refer to “the Europeans” in public discourse and the more they explicitly address a European public as “we Europeans”. While the first indicates whether the Europeans are acknowledged as a collective entity at all, the use of “we” implies a positive identification with the European community of communication.<sup>4</sup>

## Measuring Europeanization

The following table gives an overview of how we operationalize our four dimensions of Europeanization. The table shows that two dimensions are subdivided into related, but different aspects. As indicated above, monitoring governance has an institutional as well as a

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<sup>4</sup> There might be also more hidden forms of identifying with a European public, such as references to a common European past or future and the mentioning of a common European culture (see e.g. Wodak et al., 1998). Analyzing them, however, requires elaborate qualitative tools that are beyond a cross-issue quantitative content analysis.

policy-related aspect. While the first aspect describes the relevance of EU institutions and actors in domestic debates, the latter shows the degree to which EU policies are subject to public scrutiny. In a similar vein, collective public identities are characterized on the one hand by acknowledgments of “the Europeans” as a collective entity, and on the other hand by explicit expressions of belonging to this entity (“we Europeans”).

*See Table 1*

We further differentiate amongst three qualities of Europeanization: The trend and the level of transnationalization as well as its geographical scope.

The *trend* towards transnationalization refers to the process character of Europeanization, to its supposedly growing amplitude. It answers the question: How strong is the development towards the EPS? Following a suggestion by Zürn we assess the trend of Europeanization in relative terms, “as the extent of cross-border transactions relative to transactions taking place within national borders” (Zürn 2000, 187; see also Zürn 1998, 76). This allows us to assess whether we are actually witnessing a process of Europeanization or rather some other kind of transformation. For example, the increasing attention of the media to EU policies might not just be an outcome of Europeanization; it could also be the result of politicization if the media generally report more or on (domestic, European, or international) policies.

The second quality of transnationalization refers to the *level* of Europeanization already achieved. It answers the question of how relevant the Europeanization of public spheres actually is. We might find an intensive trend towards transnationalization; if it remains on a

low level, however, it would hardly amount to a noticeable transformation of public spheres albeit it might do so in the future. Similar to the trend, we assess the level in relative terms by comparing it to the level of domestic references.

The third quality of transnationalization refers to the geographical *scope* of cross-boarder interconnectedness. It answers the question: What is the scope of transnationalization? Are we really observing the Europeanization of public spheres or does public attention or transnational communicative exchange actually extend beyond Europe into a Western or eventually global public sphere? This helps us to avoid overestimating the effects of the EU on the transformation of public spheres by taking into account that European integration might not be the only possible trigger for the transformation of public spheres. International communication studies show that new technologies of communication, international news agencies, and the growing importance of international, often US-based media corporations might as well generate transnational communicative flows, albeit with a global, or rather Western, scope (Thompson 1995; Held et al., 1999; Beisheim et al., 1999; Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen 1998). Geopolitical developments such as the end of the Cold War and the threat of international terrorism might further contribute to a growing attention of public discourse beyond the narrower EU-Europe.

In our analysis we systematically search for indications of two alternative *patterns* of transnationalization: Europeanization and Westernization. If communication within Europe increases, we are witnessing the Europeanization of public spheres. If we find a parallel increase in transatlantic communicative exchange, we have a case of Westernization. We take

the USA as a rough indicator for the latter, i.e. discursive articles focusing on the US, quotation of US speakers and references to “the West” as a collective identity.

While most EPS studies narrow down their sample to EU articles, our *data set* has a broader scope. It includes articles in the political sections of newspapers covering all topics of political discourse, not just European topics. Only in that way we can examine whether transformations of public spheres really display a pattern of Europeanization or rather of broader transnationalization. Furthermore, in contrast to most EPS studies our analysis is based on a long-term perspective. It starts in 1982 at the high tides of “Eurosclerosis” and continues in seven-year steps until 2003.<sup>5</sup> We therefore can analyze whether relatively high degrees of Europeanism as they have been found for the year 2000, for instance by Trezz (2004), are actually the result of a transformation of public spheres, or rather a permanent feature of public discourse. This helps us to assess whether more European integration – as it has developed with the Common Market, the Maastricht Treaty as well as the common currency – goes hand in hand with the Europeanization of public spheres.

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<sup>5</sup> For sampling our articles we used the method of constructed weeks, in which sample dates are stratified by day of the week: i.e. for each year we sampled all newspaper articles of two randomly selected Mondays, two Tuesdays, and so on. For an account of the effectiveness of this method see Riffe, Lacy and Stephen (1998). Through this method we obtained a representative sample of 3059 discursive articles: *FAZ* 769, *Le Monde* 534, *The Times* 598, *Die Presse* 604 and *Politiken* 554 articles. A reliability test was performed for 100 randomly chosen articles across all eight coders. The test showed satisfactory values for all variables relevant to the analysis: institutions (kappa 0.79), subject of article (kappa 0.75), geographical focus (kappa 0.80), origin of discursive references (kappa 0.70), collective identity labels (kappa 0.71), and we-references (kappa 0.67).

Our sample covers a wide range of different EU member countries. It includes quality newspapers from Germany (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*), Great Britain (*The Times*), France (*Le Monde*), Austria (*Die Presse*), and Denmark (*Politiken*). The focus on quality papers is based on the assumption that a transnationalization of discourse is more likely to evolve here than in the regional press, tabloids or television. Thus, we assume that if we find no significant trend of Europeanization in quality papers, it will be found even less frequently in the other media.<sup>6</sup>

Moreover, since we are specifically interested in the Europeanization of discourse, we have developed strategies to identify *discursive articles*, i.e. articles which are most likely to contain opinions backed by justifications. Consequently, our sample includes editorials and editorial page opinion articles as well as political columns, interviews, and contributions from external authors such as intellectuals, politicians or experts, but also a range of other non-op/ed articles and pieces which analyse, interpret, argue or justify rather than simply report news.

## Empirical Results

Having elaborated a framework for the analysis, we shall now proceed by presenting the empirical results of the content analysis along the four dimensions established: Monitoring governance, mutual observation, discursive exchange and collective identification.

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<sup>6</sup> In a pre-test, the selected newspapers were compared with quality papers representing the opposite political camp, e.g. the *Guardian* with *The Times*. The test showed that differences are generally small and insignificant for the variables relevant to our analysis.



## **Monitoring Governance**

As mentioned, monitoring governance can be broken down into two questions: Does the EU play an increasingly important role in media debates as compared to other international or national institutions? And to what degree are EU policies increasingly subject to public scrutiny in comparison to other foreign or national policy issues?

We measure the *visibility of international institutions* by coding all articles that mention political institutions and by contrasting national, EU and other international institutions. What we find is a statistically significant trend towards Europeanization: The increasing political importance of the EU is reflected by a growing visibility of European institutions in public debates. The share of EU institutions mentioned more than doubles from 1982 to 2003, reaching a level of 29 %. Having said that, one must also stress that national institutions are mentioned far more often (63 % on average) than all international institutions taken together. So, the national perspective is not given up as might be expected or hoped for by supra-nationalists. Rather, it is complemented by a European spin. In contrast, the level of “non-EU” international institutions remains stable – and this means effectively falling below the amount of attention paid to the EU. The NATO as the transatlantic institution *per se* serves as a good indicator of the (non-)existence of the Westernization of public spheres. It gradually falls into public negligence and accounts for only 5 % of all references to institutions on average. Other international institutions such as the OECD and the WTO are far less visible. Only the UN (8 % on average), though nearly forgotten in the year 1989, experience rising attention in 2003 as the discussion about the US-led intervention in Iraq centered around the UN Charter and security council resolutions.

The trend of Europeanization is put into perspective, however, by the fact that even the quality press often does not differentiate between the Commission, the EP and the Council, but rather talks about the EU in general or about the Commission, leaving aside the other institutions.

A second aspect of the dimension “monitoring governance” is *public attention to policies*. To what degree does public discourse shift its attention from national policies to EU (or other international) policies in the wake of European integration? In addition to identifying articles with EU policies as the main subject<sup>7</sup>, we have counted all articles that referred to EU policies at all, even if only marginally. Thus, we can also analyze to what extent EU policies play a role in public debate of primarily national issues.

Figure 1 shows a strong and statistically significant trend towards Europeanization. Whereas EU policies are in the center of only 2 % of all articles in 1982, this share has more than tripled by 2003 (9 %). This is not embedded in a general trend towards transnationalization as the share of other foreign policies has not increased and national policies remain on about the same level. Debates on European policies focus primarily on issues such as common foreign and defense policy, monetary and financial policy, industry and competition policy as well as

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<sup>7</sup> Policies were coded as the main subject if they were mentioned in the headline or the lead of an article. Under “EU policies” we subsume what would be understood as policies in the narrower sense, like the CAP, but also e.g. discussions about institutional reform of the EU. “Foreign Policies” refers to all articles on international relations and foreign policy but not to all kinds of political coverage on other countries.

questions on enlargement, while there are fewer public discussions on agricultural policy or home affairs and judicial policy.

*See Figure 1*

It cannot go unnoticed, however, that the level of Europeanization is still relatively low – only 5 % of all articles on average as compared to 33 % on national policies. Articles on EU policies outstripped those on other foreign policy issues (11 % on average) only in 2003.

The presence of the EU in the national quality press can also be captured by counting all instances when an EU policy-field is mentioned. If there are many references to EU policies but not as the focus of the debate, this indicates a “domestication” of the EU. We find that the EU “hits home” in a rather subtle way, indeed (Börzel and Risse 2000). In 16 % of all articles EU policies are mentioned and imbedded in domestic debates with a remarkable increase from 8 % in 1982 to 22 % in 2003. This parallels the growth in the number of articles actually focusing on EU policies, but the level of articles that just mention these policies is of course much higher. We thus observe a strong parallel trend towards Europeanization in this dimension rather than stagnation or alternative forms of transnationalization such as Westernization.

Our findings help to put together the mosaic of existing empirical studies. On the one hand we have Gerhards’ study on the political coverage of German newspapers from 1950 until 1995. He observed a slight increase in the coverage of the EU by the beginning of the nineties, but still on a very low level, which let him to state: “There is no Europeanization of the German

public sphere” (Gerhards 2001:153). This corresponds with Moravcsik’s recent assessment of the EU as a mere free trade area that is not able to attract much public attention (Moravcsik 2002). In contrast, our data show that the growing attention on the EU starting in the nineties that showed up in Gerhards’ study was the beginning of a clear trend of Europeanization. There is, moreover, no reason to speculate that this trend will stop any time soon, with projects like enlargement and the European constitution staying on the political agenda.

Concerning the level of Europeanization achieved, there is a striking discrepancy between studies that find a very low level of focus on Europe (cf. Eilders and Voltmer 2003, Gerhards 2001), and the more optimistic findings of Sievert (1998) and particularly Trenz (2004: 311), who sees a “highly Europeanized” quality press. Our data prove that this discrepancy can be explained first of all by the rising tide of Europeanization in the 90s. Second, our multi-dimensional design shows that the discrepancy between high and low levels of Europeanization partly results from “artefacts” produced by the design of the respective empirical studies (Neidhardt 2004: 3). Trenz (2004: 311), for example, takes “all political references to Europe” as an indicator, thereby finding a relatively high level. This corresponds roughly to the results of our first aspect (pure mentioning of EU institutions). If we take our somewhat more demanding criterion, requiring that EU policies are the main subject of an article, we find that less than every tenth article focuses on EU policies. We suggest that these findings can only be interpreted together, establishing a moderate level of Europeanization that has not yet revolutionized the routine coverage of the national quality press.

### ***Mutual Observation***

So far, we do not know whether national public spheres display merely a segmented form of Europeanization in the sense that each one pays attention to Brussels but not to each other, or whether the monitoring of European governance is supplemented by a horizontal perspective. Are European countries also observing each other more intensively? Our data show that attention towards the outside world is relatively stable and remains on a level that is already relatively high by the beginning of the 80s.

*See Figure 2*

Figure 2 contrasts all articles focusing on other European countries with the number of articles focussing on the home country and those focussing on the US. This helps us to define the scope of the potential process of transnationalization.<sup>8</sup> As figure 2 clearly shows, there are no consistent trends toward either Europeanization or Westernization. European countries receive most attention in 1996 and least in 2003. Attention to one's own nation also peaks in 1996 and drops slightly in 2003. Attention to the US, in contrast, increases from 9 % in 1996 to 17 % in 2003.

In order to explain these figures we might look at the agenda of world politics rather than at the continuous changes of EU integration. In 1982, 1989 and 2003, major international events dominated the scene: the Falklands war, the fall of Communism, terrorist attacks and the US-led occupation of Iraq. Due to the latter the US and Iraq are the countries most often discussed

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<sup>8</sup> The geographical focus of the articles is determined by the countries referred to in headline and lead paragraph.

in all newspapers in 2003. While these major events of world politics trigger the ups and downs of public discourse, the political agenda of the EU does not influence the geographical focus of articles: The accession of Spain, Portugal, Finland or Austria to the EU has no effect on the public spheres of the other countries: The newcomers are not included any more often in the public discussion in any of our newspapers after they have joined the EU.

In the absence of clear trends, the levels of the different forms of transnationalization are especially interesting: Every second article has a transnational focus and this level has been relatively stable in the last 20 years. This shows that at least the leading quality newspapers pay considerable attention to what happens abroad. However, the focus is not specifically on European countries as they constitute only 18 % of all articles on average. These articles mostly deal with the more powerful European players such as Great Britain, France, and Germany. The US alone receives about 12 % of the attention showing that it is the powerful and not specifically the European countries that are in the focus of public debates.

### ***Discursive Exchange***

Going beyond mere attention paid to other countries or the EU in general, our third dimension grasps explicit forms of discursive exchange across national borders. To what extent do foreign speakers have a voice in public discourse? As newspapers offer different forums for external speakers, we differentiate between two major forms: *discursive contributions* and *discursive references*. Discursive contributions are interviews or opinion articles written by authors from abroad – two formats which allow for extensive opinion giving. The somewhat more frequent alternative is discursive references (i.e. direct or indirect quotations of at least

two consecutive sentences). This type of reference offers speakers the chance to express opinions and to give at least some kind of basic justification for them.

First, we cast a look at the role of the EU institutions in public discourse. Above, we have pointed out that they are mentioned quite frequently, while EU policies are less often in the center of attention. The role of the EU is even smaller when looking at discursive exchange. EU institutions may have managed to establish themselves as a frequent point of reference in media discourse but they play the rather passive role as objects and not subjects of discourse as they have not become powerful speakers in public deliberation: A continuously small share of less than 5 % of all speakers quoted represents EU institutions (e.g. Commissioners, officials, spokespersons). This would be less surprising if foreign speakers did not generally have a say in national discussions, but this is not the case as Figure 3 shows: Roughly every second discursive reference relates to national speakers, which in turn implies that every second reference comes from speakers from abroad.

*See Figure 3*

This high level of transnationalization does not come along with a trend towards more discursive references from European countries, however. Rather, the overall picture shows a relatively stable level of European speakers at 17 % on average. There is some deviation from this level in 1989 and 2003 due to developments in world politics. Specifically the focus on international terrorism after 9/11 drew attention away from Europe. This does not support the quite plausible hypothesis of Americanization as a consequence of 9/11, however. The level of American speakers in our newspapers is stable and below 10 %. This is striking since we

observed in terms of mere “mutual observation” (see above) a much stronger increase of focus on the US. The latter proves to be not a sign of a deepening of the Western community of communication but rather a reflection of the interventionist US foreign policy, which is covered by newspapers without engaging in a transatlantic discourse.

Thus, the transnationalization of public spheres seems to be consolidated on a relatively high level, but without displaying a pattern of Europeanization or Westernization. Moreover, it should be noticed that international speakers as well as fellow-Europeans, although they are frequently quoted (discursive references), rarely get the chance to express their opinion more fully in interviews and guest contributions (discursive contributions). Discursive contributions form a substantive share of our sample, as every fourth article is an interview or a guest contribution. *Transnational* discursive contributions are rare however: 82 % of guest contributions are of national origin. Nevertheless, a weak trend towards Europeanization can be observed as the share of contributions from other European countries increased from 2 to 9 % between 1982 and 2003. This increase is based on a very low level, however, and it would therefore be premature to conclude that this shows a transformation of public discourse.

Our findings coincide with Medrano’s analysis of editorials between 1946 and 1997 in which he finds only weak horizontal connections between national public spheres but a high thematic and cognitive frame convergence in the debate on Europe. Medrano calls this a “pillarized” public sphere (Medrano 2003 a,b). While the very low level of discursive contributions confirms this finding, our more subtle indicator, discursive references, helps to differentiate the picture: There is a substantial amount of transnational interaction, albeit not in the form of articles written by guest authors. Also, discursive interaction is not increasing,



which is why we suggest calling public transformation in Europe *segmented Europeanization*: national public spheres are Europeanized in that they look at Brussels more attentively but there is no increasing discursive exchange between them.

### **Collective Identification**

A precondition for the self-perception of Europeans as members of a common community of communication is that “the Europeans” as a topos exists in public discourse. Even when using the term with a negative connotation it still implies that the existence of this collective is acknowledged. Therefore, we first analyze the occurrence of the term “The Europeans” in discourse; second, its connotation; and third, the explicit identification with Europe by the use of a European “we” in public discourse (“we Europeans”). The numbers are again compared with the frequency of identification with the national or other transnational identities. In a nutshell, we find that the level of salience of the term “the Europeans” is very low and “we Europeans” hardly exists. But from this very low level, the figures gradually increase.

“The Europeans” exist as a topos in public discourse and gradually gains more importance, starting with a share of 6 % of all collectives mentioned in 1982 and rising up to slightly above 10 % in 2003. “The West” (12 % on average), however, is more common than “the Europeans” (8 % on average), but it has declined since 1989. In general we find that contrary to the increasing European trend, the demand for other transnational collectives such as “the Communists” or “the Muslims” rises and falls according to the agenda of world politics. Moreover, “the Americans” or “the Muslims” are collectives used with a neutral or negative connotation, while “the Europeans” goes with a positive connotation.

Figure 4 on the explicit use of “we Europeans” confirms that there is a trend towards the Europeanization of public identities. While we-references to the West stagnate and identification with one’s nation drops between 1996 and 2003, “we Europeans” increases from below 1 % in 1982 to 5 % in 2003. Looking at the level of identification, however, the nation is still the most frequent point of reference (40 % of all we-references) together with a broad range of very specific collective identities such as “we, the government” or “we, the farmers”. Identification with Europe is at 3 % on average; identification with “the West” is even below this figure.

*See Figure 4*

Taking the two aspects of merely acknowledging collectives and explicitly identifying with them together, one can state: Newspapers mention transnational collectives without identifying with them. While “the Europeans” exist as a collective idea, journalists and speakers identify with it much less frequently. Nevertheless, the term goes with a positive rather than with a negative connotation and there also seems to be a trend beginning towards the Europeanization of public identity, albeit in a nascent status. There is no consistent other trend of transnationalization such as Westernization.

Our findings thus re-affirm the presuppositions of scholars, which state that Europe so far suffers from being no real “Gemeinschaft” (community) and not having a demos (e.g. Kielmansegg 1996, Grimm 1995). In contrast to Risse and van de Steeg (2003, 22) who found indications of a common European identity in an admittedly “easy case” (the debate about the

right-wing extremist and racist Jörg Haider joining the Austrian government) and claimed, “The higher the salience of European issues in people’s daily lives, the more people tend to identify with Europe”, our results suggest a more cautious conclusion: On the one hand, the beginning trend towards a European public identity certainly questions the orthodox pessimism of some scholars that identification with Europe can *never* develop in the near future. On the other hand, the level of European identification is still much too low to indicate a substantive transformation of public identities.

## Conclusion

Is there a transnationalization of public discourse in Europe? In order to respond to this question, we have re-aggregated the four dimensions of our analysis in Table 2. It contrasts the trend and level of the Europeanization and Westernization of public spheres. For each dimension we calculated the strength and direction (positive/negative) of the trend relative to the domestic development. The level of transnationalization is to be understood as the share of the transnational values of a variable relative to the respective national value.<sup>9</sup> The first main column enables us to decide for each dimension and related indicator whether Europeanization has occurred. The second main column shows whether this process is embedded in a larger process of Westernization.

*See Table 2*

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<sup>9</sup> In the case of EU policies, these are mentioned in about 5% of all articles; national policies are mentioned in 33% of all articles, therefore the level has the value 16%.

A substantial and statistically significant trend towards the transnationalization of national public spheres occurs only in the first dimension: Monitoring governance. Here we clearly find a process of Europeanization that is not part of a general trend of Westernization. This trend occurs in all newspapers in our sample. For the two horizontal dimensions mutual observation and discursive exchange, we find even negative developments. While this should not be over-interpreted, we can state at least that there is no positive trend, either towards Europeanization or towards Westernization. On the fourth dimension, we find a weak trend towards Europeanization of collective identities on a very low level. Therefore, as mentioned, it would be premature to conclude from our data that a process of Europeanization of identities has occurred, but it can be said that the beginning of this trend is one towards Europeanization rather than towards Westernization.

To sum up these results in one sentence: We find a trend towards Europeanization in the sense of EU institutions and politics gaining more importance in public debates, but no increasingly transnational observation and discourse and only very weak identification with Europe.

Therefore, the overall pattern of transnationalization that we can identify for European public spheres over the last 20 years is that of segmented Europeanization. European governance is increasingly subject to public scrutiny, but neither does a common discourse in Europe develop nor a significant sense of belonging to the same community of communication.

Possible explanations for the development of this pattern of Europeanization can be borrowed from the existing literature: The increasing monitoring of EU institutions, and to a lesser extent EU policies, can be very generally explained by the growing importance of the EU in the last two decades and the increased obtrusiveness of the issues the EU deals with (cf.

Gerhards 2001). Consequently, the total number of journalists accredited in Brussels today has surpassed the number of journalists accredited at the White House or the United Nations (Meyer 2003: 240) with a total of about 1,000 accredited journalists in Brussels today (Bastin 2004: 18). Exploring how journalists dealt with different EU scandals in the course of the nineties, Meyer observes that networks of journalists have developed that were able to maintain critical reporting against all attempts by the Commission to silence the debate (Meyer 2003). The growing interest in the EU might also be fostered precisely out of the lack of transparency and accountability of the system. This lack creates a fruitful ground for corruption and nepotism, and this in turn offers the media and the critics of the current EU system an opportunity for symbolic mobilization in the form of “scandalization” (c.f. Trezz 2000). Whether public mobilization and a high saliency of EU issues will also result in the emergence of a European identity, as Risse and van de Steeg (2003) suggest, remains to be seen.

However, our findings also suggest that the role of European integration for the transformation of public spheres should not be overstated. The absence of positive trends towards more intensive mutual observation and discursive interaction indicate that the EU did not make a difference here. Instead, mutual observation is influenced by broader geopolitical developments such as international terrorism and the “9/11 effect”, which in the 2000s tend to draw attention away from Europe to the larger world. In a similar vein, the continuously high level of transnational discursive exchange since the 1980s seems to correspond to broader developments described by international communication studies (Thompson 1995; Boyd-Barrett and Rantanen 1998) and scholars studying processes of cultural globalization (Held et al., 1999; Beisheim et al., 1999). They suggest that, as early as the 1980s international news

agencies, new technologies of communication and information as well as the growing importance of international media corporations had generated a considerably dense exchange of cultural products across national borders (for figures see in particular Beisheim et al., 1999). European public spheres are influenced by these developments at least as much as by European integration.

In order to come back to the general question at the heart of much of the discussion on the transnationalization of public spheres in Europe: Is there such a thing as a European public sphere conceived as a network of Europeanized national public spheres? Is there a deficit paralleling the (equally disputed) democracy and legitimacy deficit?

Empirically, we observe that citizens today can find more discussion of EU matters in quality newspapers than 20 years ago following the increase of competencies of the EU. Even in the quality press, however, people will not learn more about what is going on in other European countries. Their opinions cannot be founded in listening more closely to ideas and arguments from speakers from other European countries, as mutual observation and exchange are not increasing. They are not much more likely to read an explicitly European perspective in media discourse.

This notwithstanding, whether a deficit should be diagnosed or not is highly dependent on how one – analytically and normatively – sees the EU, its finality, and a democratically satisfactory public sphere on a transnational level. These questions are unresolved and cannot be answered by empirical research alone. For future empirical research on the transnationalization of the public sphere, however, it will be more rewarding to analyze in

detail the driving forces behind this kind of Europeanization and the constraints inhibiting a more fully developed transnational public sphere in Europe.

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
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## Appendix: Tables and Figures


Table 1: Four Dimensions of Europeanization	
1. Monitoring Governance	
Visibility of EU institutions	Is the EU regarded as a relevant actor in public debates? Indicator: Mentioning of EU institutions
Public attention to EU policies	To what degree are EU policies subject to public scrutiny? Indicator: EU policies as subject of an article
2. Mutual Observation	
Attention to other European countries	To what degree does Europe become a relevant unit of public attention? Indicator: References to other European countries
3. Discursive Exchange	
Discursive exchange	To what extent are public spheres permeable for discursive exchange with other spheres? Indicator: Direct and indirect quotations from foreign actors and contributions by foreign actors
4. Collective Identification	
Acknowledgment of identities	Is Europe perceived as a collective entity in public discourse? Indicator: References to “the Europeans”
Expressions of belonging	Is a sense of belonging to the same European public developing? Indicator: “We”-references

Figure 1: Policies as Main Subject of Articles



Source: Representative sample of discursive articles in FAZ, LE MONDE, THE TIMES, DIE PRESSE and POLITIKEN for the years 1982, 1989, 1996 and 2003 (N=2964)


Figure 2: Observation of Other Countries



Source: Representative sample of discursive articles (incl. press reviews) in FAZ, LE MONDE, THE TIMES, DIE PRESSE and POLITIKEN for the years 1982, 1989, 1996 and 2003 (N=3059)




Figure 3: Origin of Discursive References



Source: Discursive references in representative sample of discursive articles in FAZ, LE MONDE, THE TIMES, DIE PRESSE and POLITIKEN for the years 1982, 1989, 1996 and 2003 (N=2640)

Figure 4: Collective Identification “We, the...”



Source: We-References in representative sample of discursive articles in FAZ, LE MONDE, THE TIMES, DIE PRESSE and POLITIKEN for the years 1982, 1989, 1996 and 2003 (N=1510)

**Table 2: Trends and Levels of Transnationalization**

Dimension	Indicator	Europeanization		Westernization	
		Trend	Level	Trend	Level
Monitoring Governance	Policies	7.0*	16%	-2.8	33%
Mutual Observation	Geographical Focus	-1.8	37%	3.8	24%
Discursive Exchange	Discursive References	-3.7	34%	-2.0	16%
Collective Identification	We References	3.8*	7%	-0.1	3%
<b>Mean</b>		3.2	33%	0.9	26%
<p>Legend</p> <p>Europeanization: values refer to the European policies/references in comparison to the national ones.</p> <p>Westernization: values refer to the Western, <b>but not European</b> references in comparison to the national ones (as Westernization only occurs when Europeanization is accompanied by an increase of American or transatlantic references); for the dimension monitoring governance, the values refer to international, but not European policies</p> <p>Trend: slope parameter of regression line (OLS regression) in comparison to national development with * <math>p &lt; 0.05</math></p> <p>Level: share relative to national politics/references</p>					